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[II] 
Combating a Religious Radical Ideology v. Suppressing Islamic Opposition:  
Jordan’s Approach to Counterterrorism 
 
A. Introduction  
In examining various case studies of states’ responses to terrorism, classifying response options 
was the most common way of analyzing the main trends in a certain response over a specific 
period of time, particularly in respect to legislation and policy practices. For example, Western 
responses to terrorism – pre and post 9/11 – are seen to typically fall into two basic forms of a 
repressive response; the legal repressive model or what Ronald Crelinsten calls criminal justice 
model and the war model.1 In using these two models or a hybrid of both, each western country 
has developed an independent approach to countering terrorism that reflects the different ways in 
which security has been understood, and highlights particular issues related to its history.  
 
Overall, states concerns about terrorism have given rise to important questions of practice and 
principle concerning the emergence in many of those countries of a new broad antiterrorism 
regimes or the revitalization in other countries of older antiterrorism measures. Concerns about 
the abrogation of civil and political rights and a return to martial rule eras have dominated most 
debates. While there is much literature on the legal, diplomatic and military responses to 
terrorism, particularly the more coercive or repressive kinds of responses, and their clash with 
the many western liberal traditions, there is very little on what can be called an ‘ideological’ 
response to terrorism, and almost none on its impact on societies especially those living under 
                                                 
1 RONALD CRELINSTEN, Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and 




some form of authoritarian rule, wherein measures taken are politically motivated rather than 
driven by an all-risk approach to security issues.  
 
Most contemporary experiences with terrorism, whether in the west, east or the south, have been 
connected with Islamic extremism and it is this that has shaped most significantly governments’ 
responses. As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [“9/11 
Commission”] concluded in its final report2 - the present general threat throughout the world is 
the spread of a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world that spawned terrorist groups 
and violence against its own societies as well as against foreign targets. In order to cut off the 
supply of recruits to this movement, eliminate its financial support networks, and prevent it from 
metastasizing into new regions and social pockets require an effective response that would 
ultimately undermine the movement’s ideological appeal. That should not, however, be allowed 
to tempt us to underestimate the importance of repressive approaches to counterterrorism or 
oversimplify the decisive political, religious and historical forces that are at play.  
 
Political science and security experts agree that thus far counterterrorism is nowhere close to 
approaching that effective counter-ideological approach against al-Qaeda or the radical 
ideological movement it represents.3 The United States and its western allies past experience in 
waging successful campaigns against ideologies such as fascism and communism is currently 
seen inadequate to reach Muslim audiences. There is broad consensus that far more needed to be 
done to discredit the religious viewpoint that drives continued radicalization and recruitment.  
                                                 
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT, 363 (U.S. Government Printing Office 2004). 
3 BRIAN M JENKINS, Introduction by Jenkins, in TERRORISM: WHAT’S COMING: THE MUTATING 
THREAT, 16 (James O. Ellis III ed., Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 2007). 
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 Thus, it is clear to most informed observers that the counter-ideological approach of any 
antiterrorism response is a serious problem anywhere. But nowhere has it seemed more 
problematic than it does in Muslim or Muslim majority jurisdiction. Since 9/11, particularly after 
Iraq, the prevailing perception among many Muslim countries4 aided by the radical ideological 
movement and elements of the news media that the United States and its western allies are 
locked in a “war on Islam.”5 And, many Muslim governments that are key allies to the United 
States are by proxy accused of enacting legislation and policy that is at heart anti-Islamic.  
 
It is important to note that focusing on regional and national peculiarities does not automatically 
dismiss the presence of common challenges and similarities in counterterrorism laws and policies 
around the world. As discussed in previous part, counterterrorism law and policy may frequently 
be shaped at international and regional levels, but it also often has particular domestic uses. In 
many places, including Jordan, post-9/11 developments in antiterrorism legislation and policy 
                                                 
4 A May 2004 Pew survey showed that 53 percent of Jordanians and 51 percent of Pakistanis believe the real 
purpose of the war on terror is to target unfriendly Muslims governments and groups. See, PEW GLOBAL 
ATTITUDES PROJECT, AMERICA’S IMAGE IN THE WORLD: FINDINGS FROM THE PEW GLOBAL 
ATTITUDES PROJECT (2007), available at:  http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019. 
And a 2005 Pew study found that in all five majority Muslim countries surveyed, solid majorities said they worried 
that the United States might become a military threat to their country. PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, 
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM: COMMON CONCERN FOR MUSLIM AND WESTERN PUBLICS: SUPPORT FOR 
TERROR WANES AMONG MUSLIM PUBLICS (2005), available at: 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248 
5 According to a survey conducted by in 2004 by Zogby International for the Project on Muslims in the American 
Public Square, a project run out of Georgetown's Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, more than one-third 
of American Muslims believe that the U.S. war on terrorism is really a war on Islam. This survey was a follows up 
study conducted two months after the September 11 attacks, which found that 67 percent of American Muslims 
believed that the United States was fighting a war on terror. An additional 18 percent of Muslims said the U.S. war 
was against Islam, and 16 percent said they were not sure. See, More than third of U.S. Muslims see war on Islam, 




can only be fully understood in the context of past historical concerns and current geopolitical 
realities.6    
 
Jordan’s experience with terrorists incidents and threat, suggests that measures against terrorism, 
whether national or international in nature, are unlikely to be fully effective in the absence of 
appropriate political action to deal with legitimate grievances or double standards in dealing with 
national unrest or international crises. The government is aware that issues of inequality, 
discrimination, and controversial foreign policies may lie behind or contribute to the 
radicalization of its political opponents, thus their possible resort to terrorism.  
 
This paper aims to highlight the main characteristics of Jordan’s response to terrorism, in 
particular, its distinctive approach to counterterrorism post-9/11. The main argument advances a 
less often considered response option that addresses political capabilities, what Martha Crenshaw 
terms “de-legitimation,” that is, policies and practices designed to decrease the legitimacy of the 
terrorists, thus undermine their political support.7 I contend that the way in which the 
government has dealt with its political opponents and critics is a vital element of its legal 
strategies and antiterrorism practices. Unlike many jurisdictions, the Jordanian debate involves a 
different dimension; the decision to rely on law and legal procedures to reduce the coercive and 
political capabilities of terrorists could provide a different overall pattern through introducing 
institutional changes in the realm of political repression and social control. Such an approach 
runs through the risk of being directed at those who may share the terrorists’ political goals, 
though not their means, but because they do not operate secretly are easier targets for the state. 
                                                 
6 See, part [III] of this dissertation for a more detailed discussion of these developments.  
7 Martha Crenshaw, Paper presented to the American Political Science Association: How Terrorism Ends (1987). 
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Thus, the discussion of Jordan’s approach to counterterrorism would focus on the balance 
between combating a religious radical ideology that uses instrumental political goals to attract 
recruits, radicalize a population, and marginalizing political dissent without turning it into a 
radical opposition movement that would raise public sympathy, stimulate religious indoctrination 
and use of violence.  
 
B. Jordan’s response to terrorism  
What makes a response option have a distinct approach? 
Almost each country that in one way or another has experienced terrorist incidents has adopted 
some measures in order to accommodate its legislation to the specific features of terrorists’ 
objectives and rekindle means of combat. The considerable degree to which it has been possible 
to respect the principles of law and legal guarantees of the constitutional system can be both 
surprising and alarming. In some countries, even those with well-established democratic 
traditions, governments have made ample recourse, if only for limited periods of time and 
against certain individuals, to extraordinary measures. According to scholars; with states of 
emergency and exceptions to rule of law becoming more common in established democracies, 
the distinction between authoritarian and democratic regimes starts to blur.8 Indeed, measures 
that include prolonged detentions, coercive interrogations of suspected terrorists, and military 
orders do not necessarily reflect an individualistic culture different from responses that are a 
typical feat of authoritarian regimes found in the east and the south. Yet, what makes one 
response distinct from another is the latent purpose behind use of the full force of law; the 
                                                 
8 GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005). 
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relationship between the legal system and its application, especially where the government is 
dealing with domestic groups. 
 
In his book Political Injustice,9  Anthony Pereira argues against what most studies assume that 
regimes that come to power by force or through unconstitutional manner cannot rely on law to 
maintain control of society or legitimize their continuity. He states that authoritarian regimes use 
the law to bolster their rule all the time; in particular many of them resort to court system and 
procedures to wipe their political opponents. However, it should not be assumed that all 
authoritarian regimes are similar in nature; different types of authoritarian regimes face different 
propensities to survive and develop towards democracy.  
 
A study by Hadenius and Teorell demonstrates that various types of authoritarian regimes have 
different likelihoods of breaking down and being transformed into democracy.10 The most 
durable regimes are either highly authoritarian or strongly democratic. The latter had a life span 
of 17.5 years (during the period of their investigation 1972-2003) against 25.4 years for 
monarchies. Given the patterns of change, traditional monarchies - the most stable and resilient 
to change - most often change into either non-party (party-less elections), or multiparty system 
within the monarchical framework. Among study conclusions; an authoritarian multiparty 
regime of the traditional kind is the typical stepping stone to a complete democratization. Jordan 
being a monarchical type of regime characterized by having multiparty system, while not being a 
full-fledged democracy is a very important designation that the below discussion shall draw 
upon.  
                                                 
9 ANTHONY PEREIRA, POLITICAL INJUSTICE, 5, (Pittsburgh Press 2005). 
10 Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways to Democracy (1972–
2003), 9-16 (University of Notre Dame, Working Paper No. 331, 2006). 
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 The timeframe of the below discussion is divided in three; pre-September 11, 2001 years (1968-
2001), post-September 11, 2001 and pre-November 11, 2005 period, and post-November 9, 2005 
years (2005-2008). Throughout the periods in question, Jordan’s approach has not drastically 
changed. These periods continue to share common characteristics; however, there exist some 
distinct differences that following text aims to highlight.  
 
1. Pre-9/11: a brief overview 
Jordan’s approach to counterterrorism has evolved in response to both international and domestic 
incidents. Since the previously analyzed statistical data go back to 1968, the period examined 
starts in that year. Having established this cutoff point, we proceed into the classification of 
response options during a three-decade period. The widely used classification is the one that 
distinguishes between two types of response; conciliatory and repressive responses. There are 
two common forms of a conciliatory response; accommodation, which includes negotiating and 
possibly giving in to specific terrorists’ demands, and reform by usually addressing the 
grievances without having to deal directly with terrorists. As for repressive responses, as 
mentioned in the introductory, its two basic forms; the legal repressive or criminal justice model 
in which counterterrorism adheres to criminal prosecution and punishment within the rule of law 
as terrorism is an established crime, and the war model that favors military solutions. However, 
the criminal justice and war model represent a coercive approach to countering terrorism; both 
are associated with the use of force – by police or military forces - in which serious departures 
from conventional criminal and judicial processing could be observed. In this respect, the 
14 
 
unanswered question remains; what level of force is appropriate and whether excessive use of 
force can ever be acceptable? 
  
From the late 1960s until the mid-1980s, separatists, socialist groups and nationalist; particularly 
leftist Palestinian nationalist groups, were dealt with primarily by means of repression, namely 
the military model. In 1967, after the Arab-Israeli war, emergency powers were adopted 
countrywide to deal with the terrorist threat and in response to Black September violence11 that 
was considered a serious existential danger to the regime. With the Black September, however, it 
can be argued that the government, incensed by the affront to its sovereignty, adopted a more 
violent approach, relying on army raid that ended in the expulsion of the entire guerrilla 
organization out of Jordan rather than their arrest.  
 
In the late 1980s, the military model continued to predominate in the domestic context, though 
left-wing revolutionaries no longer posed a direct terrorist threat. In the wake of the 1989 riots in 
the southern part of the country, the military model as a counterterrorism discourse was 
expanded to confront domestic violent opposition. This specific incident marked the largest-scale 
armed fighting between government troops and domestic groups since the Black September 
military clashes in the 1970s.  
 
                                                 
11 The period after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war had witnessed an upsurge in the power of Palestinian resistance 
elements in Jordan. It was in September 1970 that open fighting erupted between the military and Palestinian 
guerrilla organizations fida’yeen in what came to be known as “Black September.” This civil war culminated, after 
several broken agreements, with at least 3500 killed on all sides, and led to the expulsion of the fida’yeen from the 
kingdom to its new bases in Lebanon. For further analysis of the 1970 event see, ADNAN ABU-ODEH, 
JORDANIANS, PALESTINIANS AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, 30 (The Endowment of the 




As early as 1990, the government announced the end of the state of emergency that had been in 
effect since 1967, and with that it abandoned the military model for the criminal justice model 
i.e. criminal system, in its handling both terrorism and opposition. At the time, the military 
model had begun to gain considerable prominence in western approaches to counterterrorism 
with the emergence of Islamic radical groups throughout the Middle East, and elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, the government had no official antiterrorist policy distinct from ordinary criminal 
justice policy. It regarded terrorism as a crime, and decided to deal with terrorists within the ‘rule 
of law.’ However, one consequence of this approach had been a trend toward the militarization 
of the police within the criminal justice model. One manifestation of this has been through the 
dispatch of Special Forces12 to areas where domestic threat of use of violence against the 
government is perceived to be severe.13 Such forces are mandated to use force for what might 
otherwise be normal police work. The prevalent solution in incidents of violent opposition has 
been the use of local police, with the assistance of Special Forces units, for the apprehension of 
suspects, searches and seizures, thus terminating such incidents by means of assault.  
 
During the 1990s, granting amnesties appeared to be a proven recourse for dealing with radical 
Islamists and other government’s opponents. As part of a conciliatory approach to try to deal 
with some of the grievances professed by terrorists, the government seemed to make use of royal 
amnesties both as a deterrent message and as means of alleviating political tension. In its history, 
Jordan witnessed far more unlikely amnesties that had proved to be successful in bringing back 
                                                 
12 The “Royal Special Forces” is a unit within the Armed Forces of Jordan. It is directly connected to the king. In 
fact, the current monarch was the Commander of the unit up until he assumed the throne. Its personnel are equipped 
with the most sophisticated military equipment, and receive special military training. In 2007, Jordan hired the 
services of Blackwater Worldwide to train the unit.   
13 For background on the 1996 protests, see Lamis Andoni and Jillian Schwedler, Bread Riots in Jordan, 201 Middle 
East Report Online, (1996). 
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terrorists and government’s opponents into conventional politics.14 While this worked in the 
past, it can also backfire as in the case of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who was granted such an 
amnesty by the government in 1999. In this case, the terrorist violence came back much stronger 
and on a larger scale than before, with a move from bombing to suicide bombing.    
 
2. Post - September 11, 2001 and Pre – November 9, 2005  
Some observers point to the events of September 11, 2001, as justification for authoritarian 
regimes to put political freedoms on hold while cooperating with the United States and its 
western allies in the “war on terror.” Christopher Harding was quoted as saying that it is ‘in the 
interest of governments to take advantage of any opportunities for extending the scope of their 
measures of legal control when political circumstances are conducive to such developments.’15  
 
At a first glance, Jordan’s legislative response to 9/11 seems no different than those of the 
Anglo-American systems. Like several jurisdictions, and in compliance with its obligations 
under international law, some significant amendments to the Penal Code were enacted, mainly; 
the expansion of the definition of terrorism, the introduction of new offences, particularly 
criminalizing terrorist financing, and the extensive application of penalties, including death 
penalty in the manner explored earlier.16 Thus, along with the introduction of these amendments 
to the Penal Code, the legislation went beyond antiterrorism provisions to impose new legal 
                                                 
14 In 1957, the chief-of-staff of the Jordanian Army, Ali Abu Nuwar, led a failed military coupé against King 
Hussein. Not only was he not executed, he was pardoned and allowed to return to Jordan from exile in Egypt. 
General Ali Khairi, Abu Nuwar’s deputy and conspirator was also pardoned and allowed to live in Jordan. Similarly, 
Nathir Rashid, a free officer who has also conspired to fell the regime, was granted amnesty and was later appointed 
as Minister of Interior Affairs. See, NACHMAN TAL, RADICAL ISLAM: IN EGYPT AND JORDAN, 221 
(Sussex Academic Press 2005). 
15 Christopher Harding, International Terrorism: The British Response, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 18 
(2002), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=426921 
16 Part [II] infra.  
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restrictions that ultimately tighten control on political dissent, in particular, non-violent critics 
such as journalists and newspaper editors. This indiscriminate labeling is considered by some 
scholars as one of the most anti-democratic symptoms of an endangered state that confuses 
which violence is an action and which is a reaction.17 Perhaps one of the key objectives of 
terrorists is to provoke states into adopting security policies that expose the limits of the rule of 
law and undermines the normal authority of the state. Yet, by failing to distinguish between 
political actors who avoid the use of violence and rely on democratic means, and those who use 
violence as a first resort or as a provocative method, the government may fall for the terrorist 
strategy.  
 
The legal context of this discussion is Article 150, which on an initial reading, explicitly 
prohibits acts that result in or instigate racial, religious or sectarian bias; ultimately creating a 
climate of incitement to use violence.18 Although the amendments introduced by Temporary 
Law no. 54 of 2001 were later repealed, yet such response reflects government’s approach to use 
antiterrorism legislation against mere political opponents, thus equating between political 
expression, as a civil right, and incitement to political dissent and sedition; a recognized crime 
under international and national laws, for this purpose.  
 
                                                 
17 RONALD CRELINSTEN AND ALEX SCHMID, Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance 
Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 324 (Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid eds., Frank Cass 
Publishers 1993). 
18 It is not the subject matter of this paper to discuss the validity of Article 150 of the Penal Code. However, this 
article falls under what is widely recognized as ‘hate speech law.’ The debate in Jordan regarding measures against 
the abuse of freedom of speech and association to incite because of racial, religious or political motives is neither 
new nor different from worldwide controversy, especially in democratic societies, surrounding the respect for 
human rights. Hate speech and incitement are prohibited by international human rights law i.e. Article (4) of the 
1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which Jordan is party to.  
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The aforementioned temporary law amended Article 150 of the original 1960 text punishing for 
‘every writing, speech and act intended to or resulting in the provocation of sectarian and or 
racial chauvinism or urging discord between the sects and different elements of the nation’ by a 
prison sentence of six months to three years plus a fine of 50 dinars (US$70), to the following:  
 
Regardless of any other law, a prison sentence shall be imposed for any 
writing, speech or any act broadcast by whatever means, or publication of 
news in press or any publication, where such is of a nature to injure 
national unity or to incite commission of crimes or spread rancor and 
hatred and discord between individuals of the society or provoke racial or 
sectarian chauvinism, or injure the dignity, personal freedoms and 
reputation of individuals, or shake the basic foundations of society by 
promoting deviant behavior or immorality or by publishing false 
information or rumors or incitement to agitation or vigils or the holding of 
public meetings in a manner contravening the applicable law, or by any 
act liable to undermine the prestige, reputation or dignity of the state.  
 
A second paragraph was added to the above amended article providing for the punishment of the 
editor-in-chief and owner of any publication used in such an act, in addition to temporary or 
permanent closure of the newspapers or press ‘in accordance with a decision of the court.’ This 
paragraph became the focus of criticisms soon after an editor-in-chief of a political weekly was 
charged with ‘writing and publishing false information and rumors that may harm the prestige 
and reputation of the state and slander the integrity and reputation of its members’ after 
19 
 
publishing a critical article of the government. The constitutionality of this paragraph was 
challenged in court by a number of newspapers editors and owners, in addition to the Jordanian 
Press Association, but the court rejected the case based on lack of interest of the petitioners.19 
Under intense pressure from human rights groups, and criticism of the sweeping terms of this 
provision, the government issued in 2003 another temporary law,20 in which Article 150 was 
changed back to its original reading: ‘every writing, speech and act intended to or resulting in 
the provocation of sectarian and or racial chauvinism or urging discord between the sects and 
different elements of the nation shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to three years 
and a fine of 50 [Jordanian] dinars.’  
 
Practically, changing the article to its supra original form did not much affect the government’s 
approach in dealing with political expression in the context of combating terrorist threat.21 In 
2004, the same aforementioned editor-in-chief of the political weekly was remanded in custody 
for two weeks, in addition to its suspension, for writing an editorial deemed to harm Jordan’s 
foreign relations.22 Further, the government has extended the application of Article 150 to 
material posted on the internet. In 2007, a former parliamentarian23 was sentenced to two years 
in prison for ‘attacking the state’s prestige and reputation’ by posting an open letter on the 
                                                 
19 See, discussion in Part [V] on the mechanism of challenging the constitutionality of legislation.  
20 Temporary Law No. 45 of 2003 amending the Penal Code.  
21 The International Press Institute through its annual report “World Press Freedom Review,” monitors media 
activities and documents threats to press freedom around the world. The 2001-2007 Jordan: World Press Review 
provides a comprehensive narrative of the events in which press freedom violations were committed by the 
government during the given period. Available at: http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom.html, last visited 
October 8, 2008.  
22 On 9 May 2004, State Prosecutor ordered Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of the political weekly “Al-Majd,” to be 
remanded in custody for two weeks for writing an editorial allegedly harming ties with the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. The editorial, headlined “Cowardice Is Guideline for Policies,” reportedly accused the Saudi authorities of 
being the “lackeys” of the United States. On 10 May, the State Prosecutor also ordered the suspension of “Al-Majd.” 
INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM REVIEW: JORDAN (2004).   
23 Ahmad Abbadi, a member of parliament from 1989 to 1993 and from 1997 to 2001, is head of the Jordan National 
Movement, a party not recognized by the government. See, http://www.jordannationalmovement.com/ 
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internet to United States Senator Harry Reid in which he accused the government of 
corruption.24 
 
Another noteworthy change made by the temporary law of 2001, which was kept in the law 
promulgated by parliament in 2007, is the amendment to Article 195 of the Penal Code. This 
article falls under a heading titled ‘Slander, Libel and Defamation” crimes within the chapter on 
‘Crimes against Public Administration.’ In the original 1960 text, Article 195 prohibited lèse 
majesté – an offense against the dignity of the monarch. According to a study done by the World 
Press Freedom Committee,25 few countries still prosecute against this crime. In Jordan, it is illegal 
to mock or criticize the King, and doing so can provoke a sentence up to three years in prison.26 
However, the amendment inter alia added a new clause to the list of the offences that constitute 
the crime of lèse majesté; making it more restrictive, it states: 
 
d) Whosoever gossips about His Majesty the King or commits calumny by 
attributing to him words or deed which the King did not say or do, or 
acting to broadcast such or spread it among people. 
 
The aforementioned study makes clear that lèse majesté prosecutions are fundamentally political. 
It concludes that such laws are often used by states to punish expression it finds offensive and 
insulting. Where the defendants are overwhelmingly editorial critics of the regime, dissenters, or 
                                                 
24 HUMANT RIGHTS WATCH, JORDAN: RELEASE CRITIC CHARGED WITH SLANDER: AUTHORITIES 
MUZZLING OPPONENTS DESPITE NEW LAW (2007), available at: http://hrw.org.  
25 IT’S A CRIME: HOW TO INSULT LAWS STIFLE PRESS FREEDOM, 11 (Marilyn Greene ed., World Press 
Freedom Committee 2006). 
26 See, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STATE INJUSTICE: UNFAIR TRIALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA (1998). 
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activists in an opposition party, the law becomes a convenient tool to deploy vigorously against 
government’s adversaries in politics and journalism. In recent years, several charges were 
brought against regime critics. One of the most prominent cases that attracted much media 
attention was the charges brought against Adnan Abu-Odeh, a former head of the Royal Court 
for remarks he made during an interview broadcasted on Al-Jazeera satellite television. 
Government prosecutors had determined that Abu-Odeh’s remarks could qualify as ‘stirring up 
sectarian strife or sedition among the nation’ and lèse majesté under articles 150 and 195 of the 
penal code, respectively. Nevertheless, the charges were later dropped; a move described by 
human rights groups as a “tactic” of intimidating political opponents,27 and to lessen 
international attention to Jordan’s “retreat from democratization.”28 
 
Charges brought under articles 150 and 195, are to be tried before the State Security Court, rather 
than civil courts.29 However, this is neither new to the criminal justice system nor related to the 
9/11 attacks. The State Security Court was first established in 1952 by constitutional authority as 
a special court assigned jurisdiction over civilian perpetrators accused of offences against state 
security.30 In principle, the court is composed of a three-judge panel of either military “and/or” 
civilian judges,31 yet it has always been formed of a military majority. Between 1967 and 1990, 
                                                 
27 Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch said: “This 
apparent tactic of initiating and later dropping charges has a chilling effect on regime critics,” available at: 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/07/jordan14529.htm 
28 Jillian Schwedler, Don't Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing, 5, Middle East Report Online (2002), 
available at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070302.html 
29 Civil Courts handles civil liability that arises from violations to Press and Publications Law no. 8 of 1998, as 
amended in 1999 and 2007. The law imposes financial penalties (i.e. fine) for any violation to the provisions of the 
law. Fines for defamation, libel, insult to religious beliefs or publication of material that fuel sectarianism or racism 
reaches up to US$28,000. See, Article 38(d) and Article 46(d) of the Law. However, any act that potentially 
threatens the integrity of the state is prosecutable under the penalties of the penal code.  
30 Law no. 7 of 1952. This law was later annulled by State Security Court Law no. 17 of 1959, which apparently 
named the special court ‘State Security Court,’ giving it a permanent status, and outlined its jurisdiction and 
authorities in further detail.   
31 Article 2 of Law no. 71 of 1959. 
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the martial law era, it was replaced by a military martial court system, and was reintroduced in 
1991. In August 2001, there had been an amendment through a temporary law32 to the legislation 
establishing the State Security Court. The amendment inter alia restricted the right of appeal to 
those convicted of ‘felon’ in the State Security Court.33 What does that involve? Acts committed 
in violation to article 150 and 195 qualify as ‘misdemeanor’34 and according to the State Security 
Court law, those convicted do not have the right to appeal the sentence before Court of 
Cassation. The amendment created enormous concern among human rights and freedom of 
expression groups because of potential implications of its misuse to quell political dissent, 
whether expressed in newspapers, through political parties, in demonstrations and rallies, or 
through legal civil society organizations.35 The case of Toujan Faisal cuts to the heart of the 
matter by exposing a much larger problem of severe restrictions on political expression and civil 
rights. Faisal, a liberal from a Caucasian origin and Jordan’s first elected female deputy (1993-
1997), was sentenced in 2002 by the State Security Court for 18 months imprisonment for 
“seditious libel” and “spreading information deemed harmful to the reputation of the state.” This 
came after Faisal did an interview with Al-Jazeera television channel and published an open 
letter on the online newspaper, Arab Times,36 in which she accused the government of 
                                                 
32 Temporary Law no. 44 of 28 August of 2001. In accordance with the Constitution, the law was submitted for 
parliamentary scrutiny and review, wherein it was approved after introducing some amendments, and promulgated 
by Law no. 22 of 2004.  
33 In accordance with the Constitution, this Temporary Law was submitted for parliamentary scrutiny and review, 
wherein it was approved after repealing the 2001 controversial amendment that denied individuals convicted of 
‘misdemeanor’ the right to appeal before the Court of Cassation. The law was promulgated by Law no. 22 of 2004. 
34 Article (21) of Penal Code states that the penalty imprisonment for a misdemeanor ranges between a week and a 
three-year. 
35 In June 2002, the Jordanian Bar Association held a one-week boycott from appearing before the Court in protest 
of the amendment to the State Security Court Law eliminating this right of appeal. See, LYNN WELCHMAN, Anti-
Terrorism Law and Policy in Arab States, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, 600 (Victor 
Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach eds., Cambridge University Press 2005). 
36 Until 2001, Jordan was considered a country with a relatively open internet service. However, since then, the 
government has asked Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block access to some independent news sites and pushed 
through laws threatening freedom of expression in the media, including the Internet. Hence, all ISPs were 
technically forced to pass through a state company to access the Internet, which meant all online messages were 
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corruption.37 Faisal’s lawyer were unsuccessful in contesting the constitutionality of supra 
temporary law that made appeal in her case impossible. Nevertheless, she was granted a ‘special’ 
royal amnesty based on “humanitarian grounds” that released her from prison before completing 
her sentence, thus kept her criminal conviction. According to Jordanian laws, individuals 
convicted of non-political crimes such as crimes against public morality and order are unfit to 
practice certain professions or run for public office.38  
 
It is often said that the choice of basic approach to counterterrorism is important. Thus, 
fundamental to any research concerning terrorism is a definition, especially when looking at the 
law. Why? There is a general belief that in order to combat a monster, one needs to understand its 
nature and modus operandi. A workable definition that describes the main characteristics of 
terrorism is seen necessary to devise domestic security policies and make certain solutions 
thinkable within that particular framework. Based on the above discussion, it is clear that 
Jordan’s approach to counterterrorism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 fails to follow suit. It is 
very difficult to reach any cogent analysis of Jordan’s counterterrorism policy by linking 
between text definition of terrorism and the legal framework developed to deal with. Yet, what if 
the conventional discussion of construing a policy by looking at a definition is turned around? 
Theoretically speaking, can we attempt to enunciate a definition of terrorism from the approach 
used by Jordan?  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
monitored by the government. Some of the websites blocked were, www.arabtimes.com, www.arabmail.de and 
www.ammannet.net. For further discussion, see source cited supra note 22. 
37 Faisal was detained in March 2002 after accusing the then prime minister, in an open letter to the government 
published online on the Arab Times newspaper, of “benefiting personally” from a government decision to double car 
insurance premiums, in one of a series of temporary laws called “essential’ to the country's security. Wasn't it 
curious, she asked, that Abu Ragheb's [Prime Minister] family dominates the car insurance industry in Jordan? See 
supra note 28 at 1.  
38 For example, see Article 3(c)(2) of the Elections Law, Temporary Law no. 34 of 2001.  
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A paper by Jeff Goodwin offers a socio-scientific theory of terrorism that emphasizes on the 
strategic choice of terrorism by social movements. He suggests a theory of “categorical 
terrorism,” in which terrorism is directed against anonymous individuals by virtue of their 
belonging to a specific ethnic, religious, national or social group. He emphasizes that groups that 
employ this type of terrorism are oppositional political groups, which views terrorism as a 
political strategy. In recent years, it has been employed by radical Islamist groups. Goodwin 
defines categorical terrorism as “the strategic use of violence and threats of violence, usually 
intended to influence several audiences, by oppositional political groups against civilians or 
noncombatants who belong to a specific ethnicity, religious or national group, social class or 
some other collectivity, without regard to their individual identities or roles.”39  
 
Given the perceived threat of radical elements within the country’s Islamic movement and their 
potential use of violence in order to change the political, and perhaps the socioeconomic, order in 
more or less fundamental ways; Goodwin’s aphorism about categorical terrorism explains – 
better than extant definition - Jordan’s decision to use counterterrorism law and legal procedures 
in dealing with political opponents who may or may not, employ a strategy characterized by the 
use of violence against civilians. Although Goodwin admits that his theory requires more 
rigorous empirical testing, however, the definition offered is entirely in tandem with Jordan’s 
emergent counterterrorism approach. This perception of terrorism suggests that the choice of 
counterterrorism approach is in large part of how opponents perceive their government. This 
deduction not only shows a difference in the overall pattern of political repression, but also a 
distinctive approach to counterterrorism.  
 
                                                 
39 Jeff Goodwin, A Theory of Categorical Terrorism, 84 Social Forces, 2031 (2006). 
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The period that followed the United States attack on Iraq in 2003, indicated the government’s 
inclination toward adopting a different approach in dealing with political dissent and the issue of 
terrorism alike. It witnessed some kind of metamorphic change from mere political 
repressiveness into counter-ideological approach that targeted Islamic activism. Following the 
end of the Iraq war in April 2003, the number of Islamists detained on suspicion of belonging to 
Al-Qaeda witnessed a steep increase in terrorism-related arrests. According to Amnesty 
International’s Jordan Country Report, the numbers climbed from 50 in 200140 into hundreds in 
the period between the years 2003 - 2005.41 A constellation of favorable circumstances might 
have triggered this refocus. The rising tide of radical Islamist groups associated with the 
unparalleled level and sophistication of violence; primarily in Iraq and the Palestinian occupied 
territories required a careful look at the potential threat of radical Islamists. In addition, the 
release of the 9/11 Commission final report that summoned up the United States, and the West’s, 
growing realization42 that the enemy is one that goes beyond a finite group of people i.e. Al-
Qaeda, to include a radical ideological movement was certainly encouraging to prove to the 
West, in particular the United States, that Jordan is a proactive and reliable ally against terror in 
the region.  
 
                                                 
40 U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM REPORT (2004), available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2004/35500.htm 
41 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JORDAN COUNTRY REPORT (2000- 2005), available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/. See also, Crisis Group interviews with a court correspondent, Amman, 28 March 2005, 
and with Samih Khreis, defense lawyer and member of the Jordanian Bar Association, Amman, 30 March 2005. No 
official statistics have been published on how many of those standing trial for these charges were in Afghanistan at 
one time, but observers believe they constitute a majority. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, JORDAN’S 9/11: 
DEALING WITH JIHADI ISLAMISM 3 (2005).  
42 A transatlantic poll released by the German Marshall Fund in July 2006 reported that Americans and Europeans 
are in close agreement that the three greatest threats to global peace over the next decade are terrorism, Iran getting a 
nuclear weapon and radical Islamic fundamentalism. Available at: http://www.gmfus.org 
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Yet, in an attempt to diffuse public pressure owing to mass opposition to the Iraq war and 
government’s overall pro-western policies; Jordan set a new tone that seemed to characterize its 
future approach to counterterrorism. In 2004, King Abdullah II issued a statement called the 
Amman Message [“the Message”] calling for tolerance and unity in the Islamic world.43 On the 
outset, it was an ideological counter-message or some form of a sophisticated attack on the 
distortion of Islam being made by Bin-Laden and his followers; however, it also revealed a new 
course in dealing with political opponents, one that is primarily focused on the Islamist 
movement opposition, its foreign allegiance, and essentially, its role in provoking a radical 
political opposition to achieve its political goals. The Message attempted to address the methods 
and means in which radical Islamic groups utilize to attract recruits and influence radicalism in 
matters of religious interpretation. Most importantly, it placed parameters for the issuance of 
religious edicts fatwas which radical Islamists use as a vehicle to spread their ideology, including 
the takfiri ideology i.e. to declare a person an apostate. In the immediate term, the Message was a 
benign effort to counteract and reduce the political credibility of radical Islamists. Thus, it lacked 
the legal framework or teeth to delegitimize such acts by making it a crime punishable under the 
law.   
 
And in 2006, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leadership,44 in a tactical move, affirmed its 
adherence to the fundamentals of the Message, and its rejection “to terrorism in all its forms.”45 
It has also received exceptional media attention and was praised by world western leaders.46 
                                                 
43 The official website for the Amman Message is available at: http://www.ammanmessage.com 
44 The Message was endorsed in July 2005 Islamic Convention by religious leaders representing the eight Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence. 
45 Declaration issued by the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan, July 2006, available at: 
http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=35 




However, it failed to resonate with significant audiences, including Jordanians for two main 
reasons: a) it was a top-down initiative47  issued by pro-western monarch, who is seen as 
someone who does not have enough credibility as a religious figure in the Islamic world to 
deliver this counter-message.48 Jordan’s close alliance with America has weighed down such 
initiative to a mere United States propaganda; b) the inner circle of Al-Qaeda and its dedicated 
cadres who make up the ranks of affiliated terrorist groups have proved to be almost immune to 
counter-ideological messages, on the contrary, such messages might be viewed as provocative by 
radicals.  
 
3. Post – November 9, 2005 [“11/9”]49 
11/9 marks a no less significant date to Jordanians than 9/11 is to Americans. Not only the 
country experienced the deadliest attacks in its history, it has instigated an important shift in the 
Jordanian legal culture. The suicide attacks were perpetrated by Iraqis who were enraged by the 
war in their country, and chose a close American ally as a target for their revenge. Yet, they were 
masterminded by a Jordanian; Al-Zarqawi, who at that time elicited high levels of domestic 
sympathy as a Jordanian hero who gave voice to hostilities toward the United States. Al-Zarqawi 
had relied in past attempts on Jordanians for domestic attacks, but his decision to recruit non-
                                                 
47 King Abdullah implicitly acknowledged this in a speech in Washington D.C. in September 2005 in which he 
noted that “God willing, [the Amman Message] will expand to engage the popular preachers and grassroots activists 
-- what is called the (Muslim street).” Quoted in Jordan Times, September 14 2005. 
48 According to Suhail Nakhouda, editor-in-chief of the Amman-based Islamica magazine, Crisis Group interview, 
Amman, 17 April 2005. See source cited supra note 41 at 16.   
49 Three suicide bombers attacked the Days Inn, the Radisson SAS and Grand Hyatt hotels in Amman as part of a 
coordinated attack on three Western targets that killed 63 people (including three perpetrators) and wounded more 
than one hundred. The explosive device of a female suicide bomber at the Radisson SAS failed to go off and was 
later arrested by Jordanian authorities. Sajida Al-Rishawi made full confession of Jordanian national television. On 
September 21, 2006, the State Security Court in Jordan sentenced her to death by hanging. See, MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base, available at: http://www.mipt.org, last visited March 30, 2008.  
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Jordanians in this specific incident was seen as a tactical move in which he exploited a key 
intelligence weakness in detecting foreign elements.50  
 
Nevertheless, the government reasonably understood that while the attacks might have temporary 
lessened support to Al-Zarqawi,51 many Jordanians, who share same religious ideology,52 might 
still sympathize and even accept similar future attacks aimed at government institutions, United 
States and Israeli targets, and Western civilians. The regime became particularly concerned with 
managing its Islamic opposition not only as a potential challenge to its power and legitimacy, but 
as a group vulnerable to the influence of radical Islamists, inside and across its borders, who 
would exploit the Islamic opposition’s dissatisfaction with the government to radicalize its 
institutions that would nurture, harbor and support terrorists.  
 
The attacks gave the regime the leverage to announce its new counter-ideological approach that 
in essence builds on its earlier effort; the Message, and develops it into a legal and regulatory 
framework designed to stop further radicalization and new recruits. As articulated by the words 
of the king; the 11/9 attacks “affirm the extent of our need to adopt a comprehensive strategy to 
confront takfiri culture. Such a strategy does not envision security solutions alone, but also takes 
into account the intellectual, cultural and political dimensions of standing up to those who are 
                                                 
50 See latter source cited supra note 41 at 1.  
51 Poll conducted by Ipsos, as reported in the daily Al-Ghad and cited in The New York Times, 16 November 2005. 
An earlier poll had shown 60 percent support for Osama bin Laden among Jordanians. 
52 The Pew Global Attitudes Project released figures in July 2005 that about 60 percent of Jordanians indicated they 
saw suicide bombings and other violent actions as justifiable in defense of Islam, and nearly half felt that suicide 
bombings against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq were justifiable. See, PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES 
PROJECT, ISLAMIC EXTREMISM: COMMON CONCERN FOR MUSLIM AND WESTERN PUBLICS: 
SUPPORT FOR TERROR WANES AMONG MUSLIM PUBLICS (2005).  
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charting paths of destruction and sabotage to realize their aims.”53 In this context, a word of 
warning was sent to the media to take responsibility in promoting tolerance and fighting the 
radical ideology “in a way that is consistent with Jordan’s interests.”54 As an incentive, the 
government promised amendments to media laws as part of an overall reform process to 
minimize state interference in the press and ease some of the restriction on journalists to freely 
carry out their work. Hence, article 42(2) of the Press and Publications Law no. 8 of 1998 was 
amended by adding a provision: “Detention as a result of enunciation of an opinion in speech, 
writing or through other means of expression is not allowed.” At the same time, other tenets of 
the penal code were amended to allow increased fines for defamation, libel, insult to religious 
beliefs or publication of material that fuels sectarianism or racism.55  
 
Overall, the government did not abandon its previous approach that was influenced by its 
determination to marginalize political dissent, hence the heightened use of restrictive legal 
measures to curb political expression. Yet, following the 11/9 event, it was established that the 
forthcoming period would be about discouraging sympathizers among Islamic opposition per se 
from supporting radical adversaries, and reduce the number of potential new recruits for radical 
groups. According to the declaration of Marouf Bakhit – appointed Prime Minister following the 
11/9 attacks – to the parliament: ‘the suicide bombers made us more determined to move forward 
in our pre-emptive war against terrorism and the ‘takfiri’ culture,’ and that his cabinet is 
determined to fight Islamic extremists.56 One might question if there was a parallel strategy 
                                                 
53 Royal Letter of Designation from His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan to Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit 
(November 24, 2005), http://www.pm.gov.jo/english/  
54 Id.  
55 Article 195 of Penal Code no. 16 of 1960 as amended by law no. 16 of 2007.  
56 Jamal Halaby, Jordan premier vows ‘pre-emptive’ war against Islamic extremism, The Associated Press, 
(December 14, 2005). 
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devised to deal with the threat of non-Jordanian terrorists other than measures taken to increase 
intelligence powers. Though it seems illogical to separate between Jordanian and non-Jordanians 
in terms of terrorism and counterterrorism, thus this paper strives to stay focused on the domestic 
aspect of the threat and the approach taken as a result.  
 
The legal framework developed here could be applied to three main issues. The first concerns 
dissuading radicals from attacking Jordan by enacting a special anti-terror legislation to 
supplement the provisions of the Penal Code. In other words, the assumption is to match “terror” 
with “legal terror” to deter Islamic opponents who think of using violence as a means of Islamic 
activism from committing such acts. The second issue concerns limiting religious space by 
controlling sources of radicalization or (physical environment) that radicals would use to 
influence their target audience. A Rand Corporation research identified three nodes or physical 
venues for radicalization: radicalized mosques, educational establishments and prisons.57 Thus, 
focus is turned to the question about preventing radicals from spreading their ideology via 
religious services or places of worship. The last issue concerns the management of collective 
action through controlling platforms that expose mainstream moderate Islamists to those who 
may offer them alternative ideologies and alternative courses of action, including violence. The 
assumption here is that a state through social control manages to keep Islamic activism under 




                                                 
57 GREG HANNAH, LINDSAY CLUTTERBUCK AND JENNIFER RUBIN, RADICALIZATION OR 
REHABILITATION: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE OF EXTREMIST AND RADICALIZED 
PRISONERS, 1, (Rand Corporation 2008). 
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a. Prevention through Legal Deterrence: Prevention of Terrorism Law [“PTL”] 
Formulating an appropriate legal response to terrorism, in general, presents governments 
with a political dilemma. Political and security theorists suggest that by failing to act 
decisively, a government runs the risk of providing terrorists with the opportunity to 
realign in a manner that would allow for further and even more devastating attacks. 
Equally, there is the normative danger of over-reacting. A spate of new antiterrorism laws 
enacted following a high-profile attack often features enhanced penalties for acts defined 
as terrorism. In many jurisdictions it introduces extraordinary powers that could spread to 
other parts of the criminal law.58  
 
Thus, the enactment of new criminal laws is seen to have different implications. Victor 
Ramraj talks about what criminologists refer to as ‘govern[ing] through crime’ and states’ 
tendency to rely on the law as the solution to distress a terror event.59 Laura Donohue 
suggests that some counterterrorism measures impose fear and violence without regard to 
guilt or innocence in order to impress a larger audience.60 Kent Roach argues that the 
enactment of new criminal laws after acts of terrorism implies that the existing criminal 
law was inadequate to respond to acts of terrorism, thus deter radicals from committing 
future attacks.61 Though, he claims that the accuracy of such an argument depends on the 
baseline established by the ordinary criminal law in each particular jurisdiction.62 For 
instance, in Jordan’s jurisdiction, in addition to having a ‘terrorism’ crime long before 
                                                 
58 We have seen how the amendments introduced to Jordan’s Penal Code immediately after 9/11that spread to 
slander and libel crimes, in addition to lèse majesté.  
59 Victor V. Ramraj, Terrorism, Risk Perception and Judicial Review, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW 
AND POLICY 113 (2005).  
60 Laura Donohue, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Discourse, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND 
POLICY 23 (2005).  




9/11, other ordinary crimes with respect to attempts, conspiracy and accomplice liability 
for crimes such as murder and bombings could already be applied to terrorists. In 
addition, tough penalties i.e. death penalty are already employed for such serious acts.  
 
One way of determining the instrumental value of a new counterterrorism law in 
preventing terrorism is to examine the criminal law that existed before a successful terror 
attack triggered such response. As illustrated in following sections, in the aftermath of 
9/11, criminal law reform in Jordan was part of the worldwide expansion of criminal laws 
facilitated by UNSC Resolution 1373 that was enacted under mandatory Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. The resolution instigated the pattern of reactive reform by calling on all 
countries to ensure that terrorist acts, including the financing of terrorism, ‘are 
established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the 
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts.’ To a certain extent, 
Jordan seems to have taken the UNSC resolution provisions as a deadline for enacting 
new counterterrorism laws, and as an opportunity to pledge its strong support for the 
United States in its ‘war on terror.’ Probably with the exception of the new laws against 
the financing of terrorism,63 the introduced criminal law amendments were largely 
offered as a symbolic response to 9/11 without fully understanding the dimensions of 
deterrence. 
   
                                                 
63 Although they were featured in the UNSC resolution 1373 and reflected in new criminal law amendments and 
counterterrorism laws, there are reasons to doubt the deterrence effect of laws against financing terrorism. The 
objects of such financing are not terrorists per se or their ideological supporters, but third parties such as banks and 
those who provide terrorists with financial support. These laws are seen as an expansion of the traditional scope of 
antiterrorism laws and the impact of security strategies that relied more on risk management strategies.  
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Nevertheless, one week after the Amman bombings killed sixty people and wounded 
around hundred others on November 9, 2005, the government proposed a new bill as an 
emergency measure that, in principle, was to include both punitive and self-protective 
measures for the state and individuals, respectively. It was not until November 2006 that 
the law went into effect after being promulgated by parliament and published in the 
Official Gazette.64  As its title indicates, the legislation’s main objective is to stop future 
attacks from taking place. Before, the authorities relied on the country’s Penal Code to 
deal with terrorism-related issues, whether to punish for committed acts, or to deter 
through the imposition of punishment or by increasing already existing penalties.  
 
Normally instant new criminal laws in the wake of terrible terrorist attacks rely on 
broader and tougher offences to punish and prevent acts of terrorism. In the American 
context, the Patriot Act,65 incorporated new criminal offenses in a manner that asserts 
Professor Roach’s claim and demonstrate the belief that broadening and toughening the 
criminal law will deter future acts of terrorism. The crime of providing material support 
for terrorism, which was first created in 1996 in the wake of Oklahoma City bombings, is 
one example of a crime that was broadened to include the provision of monetary 
instruments and ‘expert advice and assistance’ to terrorist groups.66 The maximum 
penalty for this offence was increased from ten to fifteen years with the possibility of life 
imprisonment if it involves taking a human life.67  
                                                 
64 Terrorism Prevention Law no. 55 of 2006.  
65 The final bill, the Patriot Act was introduced into Congress on October 23, 2001 and approved by both Houses 
(357-66 vote in the House of Representatives and 98-1 vote in the Senate).  It was signed into law by President Bush 
on October 26, 2001. However, the original version of the Bill was introduced six weeks before enactment. 
66 Patriot Act ss. 805 
67 Patriot Act ss. 810 
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 Discussions dealing with the deterrent value of higher and harsher penalties normally 
differentiate between terrorists and third parties who may provide support to terrorists. 
Seemingly, the severity of punishment is likely to have a marginal impact on terrorists;68 
a suicide bomber planning a terror attack must know that he will be facing relatively high 
maximum penalties. Further, foreign terrorists such as the Iraqis who perpetrated the 11/9 
attacks will most likely be unfamiliar with the relevant penalties for the crime they plan 
to commit or basically indifferent about anything besides furthering their cause. 
However, third party terrorists who facilitate or provide assistance may be more 
amenable than terrorists to deterrence. Professor Alan Dershowitz attributes that to the 
calculated and political nature of terrorism.69 He has proposed deterrence strategies that 
depend in part on collective punishment.70 Although he admits that this might be ‘the 
most immoral technique for combating terrorism’71 in which people suffer harm and 
stigma because of suspicions that they are terrorists, yet he concludes that ‘any effective 
attack calculated to reduce terrorism must include an element of collective responsibility 
and punishment for those supporting terrorism.’72 Although this argument is more of a 
feature present in authoritarian regimes, yet it is apparent in the Patriot Act, which 
captured its essence and established a separate section73 that punishes with up to ten 
years imprisonment ‘whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or he has 
                                                 
68 See source cited supra note 61 at 138.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 137 
71 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, 117 (Yale University Press 2002). 
72 Id. at 181 
73 It is a federal crime to harbor aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1324, or those engaged in espionage, 18 U.S.C. 792, or to commit 
misprision of a felony (which may take the form of harboring the felon), 18 U.S.C. 4, or to act as an accessory after 
the fact to a federal crime (including by harboring the offender), 18 U.S.C. 3. See, CHARLES DOYLE, 
TERRORISM: SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT, 46 (Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress 2001).  
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reasonable grounds to believe, has committed or is about to commit’ a long list of 
offences associated with terrorism.74  
 
However, similar to other regions’ immediate reactions, Jordan’s legislation stirred an 
enormous amount of public debate among some lawmakers, human rights watchdog 
groups and civilian society associations. Several human rights activists warned against 
the legislation saying it would turn the country into a ‘police state’. Fifteen Islamic 
Action Font lawmakers75 denounced the law affirming that the PTL would encourage 
terrorism because its “unjust clauses and sever punishments will oppress many people 
and lead to the creation of more terror groups.”76 Secretary General of the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood Jamil Abu Bakr said the law would “strengthen the grip of the 
security forces and limit public freedoms.”77 Leaders of other opposition groups and 
professional associations accused the regime of nearing the completion of a full circle 
back to martial rule, describing the law as “a blunt violation of the Constitutional and the 
International Declaration of Human Rights.”78 Amnesty International voiced similar 
concerns calling upon the government ‘to repeal the legislation or amend it to bring it at 
minimum in line with the obligations of Jordan under international law.’79 
 
                                                 
74 The Patriot Act ss. 803.  
75 Fifteen out of the sixteen Islamist lawmakers who occupied House seats during the (2003-2007) parliament.   
76 Jamal Halaby, Jordan parliament OKs terrorism law, 1, The Associated Press (August 2006).  
77 CARNIGIE’S ARAB REFORM BULLETIN, JORDAN: GOVERNMENT APPROVES ANTI-TERRORISM 
LAW (2006).  
78 UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, JORDAN: ANTI-TERRORISM LAW CALLED MARTIAL, 1 (August 
29, 2006). 
79 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JORDAN’S ANTI-TERRORISM LAW OPENS DOOR TO NEW HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, 1, (2006), available at: www.amnestyusa.org 
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A significant question that lays siege to above concerns over the impact of the legislation 
on public freedoms, mainly political expression, and the legal structure of the state: is 
how effective was the enactment of that particular law in accomplishing the immediate 
aim of the government i.e. deterrence value on radical Islamic elements. Yet, under such 
circumstances, how is this measure evaluated in determining the effectiveness of the 
regime’s overall strategy of marginalizing Islamic political opposition.   
 
To probe the matter, the argument below is based on the two assumptions that dominate 
the counterterrorism legal discourse: that existing criminal structure, as opposed to its 
enforcement, was to blame for the failure to prevent terrorism. Thus, giving the 
government the political legitimacy and obtaining the moral high ground to address this 
inadequacy by enacting special counterterrorism legislation. The second is that 
establishing collective responsibility and punishment for religious identification based on 
radical ideology is necessary to deter future terrorist recruitment. Here, the principles of 
individual responsibility and legality are stretched in a manner that provides the state 
with an opportunity to exercise an important restraining influence on public dissent.  
 
The first assumption will be addressed through shedding light on two terror incidents that 
exemplifies the argument that the provisions of ordinary criminal law have been tough 
enough to handle terrorism, and the emphasis on the criminal sanction and retributive 
punishment do not necessarily create the desired level of deterrence. The first incident is 
part of what the 9/11 Commission Report referred to as the ‘Millennium Crisis’.80 It 
involved the trial of a group of militant Jordanians of the ‘Hijazi cell’. Raed Hijazi, a dual 
                                                 
80 See source cited supra note 2 at 174.  
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national of Jordan and the United States, who in 2002 was sentenced to death81 after 
Jordanian intelligence services intercepted a telephone call that helped foil a plot to blow 
up a fully booked, 400-room Jordanian hotel and two Christian tourist sites on the border 
with Israel on the eve of the millennium in December 1999. Though this plot had been 
implicated in the Bin Laden-linked Millennium plot in 1ate 1999, it is believed to be Al-
Zarqawi’s first major attempt at a terrorist attack in Jordan. As a result, Al-Zarqawi was 
convicted in absentia and sentenced to death by Jordan’s State Security Court for his 
involvement. The terror attempt took place prior to 9/11 in which intelligence services 
actions reflected vigilance and efficiency, and militants involved were referred to a state 
security court for trial on counts of crimes pursuant to Jordan’s Penal Code.82  
 
The marginal deterrent value of new tougher criminal laws and harsher penalties becomes 
apparent in the second incident. In December 2002, Jordanian authorities arrested two 
men, a Libyan and a Jordanian, who later admitted to carrying out the assassination of 
United States diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman in November 2002 after receiving 
money from Al-Qaeda leader Al-Zarqawi. The two men had been charged with murder, 
and sentenced to death by the military court. Six other men, including Al-Zarqawi, were 
sentenced to death in absentia.  
 
                                                 
81 Hijazi’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment on 11 February 2002 by the State Security Court. On 
a separate note, Amnesty International has reported human rights violations relating to Hijazi’s case. AI was 
concerned at reports that Raed Hijazi was tortured during interrogations and his confessions were made under 
duress, thus are inadmissible as evidence in trials and are a violation of international law. AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, JORDAN: DEATH PENALTY/TORTURE/UNFAIR TRIAL – RA’ED MUHAMMAD 
HIJAZI (February 13, 2002).  
82 The counts of crimes are: membership in an illegal organization, conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts, possession 
of explosives without a license and for illegal purposes, and preparing an explosive device without a license. 
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Up until November 9, 2005, Jordan had been spared large scale terror attacks and suicide 
bombings. According to remarks made by the king to the New York Times, Jordan’s 
intelligence services had thwarted since April 2004 no less than 150 other terror attempts 
by militant Islamists affiliated with Al-Qaeda.83 Following 9/11, there has been 
considerable increase in prosecutions and referrals to the State Security Court for acts 
committed in violation of penal code that falls under its jurisdiction, in which death 
penalty had been employed for conspiracy offences, attempted crime, as well as 
committing the most serious acts of terrorism. As the Jordanian experience of subsequent 
terror incidents demonstrate, security services, prosecutors and courts – notwithstanding 
its controversy among human rights groups - have sufficient capabilities to investigate 
apprehended acts of terrorism. Needless to say, this had not had any deterrent effect on 
Al-Zarqawi, his followers and other radicals from attacking again.  
 
However, from the above discussion flows the second interrelated assumption of this 
argument. Jordan’s pledge to enact special counterterrorism legislation was part of an 
immediate impetus to do something following the high-profile attacks. It worked as a 
short-term measure to first; appease public anxiety by denouncing the terror acts and 
expressing solidarity with the victims, and second; carry strong moral and religious 
overtones. The state understood the political nature of the terror threat, and the danger of 
radicals who move from rejecting the state’s legitimacy to advocating their ideologies 
and attempting its violent overthrow. Thus, Jordan’s legislative response to the attacks 
instituted the notion of collective responsibility based on ideological identification to 
                                                 
83 Michael Slackman, 11 Top Jordanian Advisers Resign in Wake of Attacks, 2,2, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 




influence public discourse through criminalizing, and seeking to punish those 
ideologically supporting terrorism.  
 
Indeed, apart from introducing the notion of collective responsibility for ideological 
identification in the context of a terror crime, the PTL did not propose any amendments 
in the realm of individual criminal responsibility and punishment to any of the relevant 
criminal laws nor did it introduce extraordinary measures other than those already 
existing under such laws. For instance, Article 8 gives the State Security Court 
jurisdiction over terror crimes defined and identified by the law. It only makes sense to 
re-establish the jurisdiction of the court over terror-related crimes if only the state’s 
intention was to cover the notion of collective responsibility for ideological identification. 
Why? Under article 4 of the State Security Court Law of 1959, the court is assigned broad 
jurisdiction over individuals accused of offences - committed or attempted - against state 
security, including aiders, abettors and accessories. There is no jurisdictional limitation 
on extending collective responsibility based on mere ideological agreement that justifies 
the use of violence. Hence, such court has fewer procedural judicial protections than 
other ordinary courts since it has the discretion not to follow the regular Law of Criminal 
Procedures84 that sets the limits to rights and freedoms. However, this notion appears 
implicit in the definition of terrorism. Article 2 states:  
 
“Any intentional act committed by whichever means that leads to killing 
or causing physical harm or inflicting damages to public or private 
property or transportation or environment or infrastructure or 
                                                 
84 Law of Criminal Procedure no. 9 of 1961. 
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international entities premises or diplomatic missions if the intention of 
that action was to disturb public order and endanger public safety and 
security or impede the implementation of the law or Constitution or to 
influence state or government’s policy or force it to act or restrain or 
endanger national security by fear or terror or violence.”  
 
Ostensibly, the definition does not define terrorism as conduct or in criminal law terms 
the actus reus or material element of the offence. Any intentional act covers ‘inchoate’ 
offences, where no result should necessarily occur. Thus, the act can vary between one 
that causes death, serious injury or damage to property, to a less precise act such as the 
one defined by Article 147 of the Penal Code which covers ‘violence’ or the ‘threat of 
violence’, to engaging in certain political activity.85 Nevertheless, the law does not 
impose collective punishment or specify any penalty for any intentional act that qualifies, 
according to the definition, as terrorism. 
 
Article 3 prohibits in more general terms such acts of terrorism, thus, designates three 
terrorism offences related to the formation, recruitment or membership in associations 
that are not necessarily illegal or a terror group but may commit acts that could fall under 
terrorism. In Jordan’s criminal system, establishing a ‘villains’ association or group is 
                                                 
85 Article 147 of the Penal Code of 1960, as amended in 2001 and 2007, defines terrorism as follows: “Terrorism 
shall mean the use of violence or threat of use thereof, whatever its motivations and purposes, occurring in 
implementation of an individual or collective criminal plot aimed at disturbing public order or jeopardizing the 
safety or security of society, where such is of a nature to spread fear among the people or frighten them or to expose 
their lives and security to danger, or to cause damage to the environment, or to cause damage to, occupy or take 
over public facilities and realty or private realty, international facilities and diplomatic missions, endangering 
national resources or thwarting the provisions of the Constitution and laws.” For a detailed discussion on the 
evolution and subsequent amendments on Article 147, see Part III of this dissertation under heading: The role of 
United Nations measures against terrorism in developing the legal framework of Jordan’s response to terrorism.  
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criminalized long before 11/9 or even 9/11.86 Various forms of membership or 
participation in an ‘illegal’ association or group may also be punished.87 However, article 
3(a) challenges a basic principle of criminal law i.e. the requirement for a clear illegal act 
that is committed with fault. In essence, this provision introduced the concept of virtual 
association based on sharing the political cause of terrorists that is essentially ideological 
in nature, not on material support. It states:  
 
‘Attempting by any means – direct or indirect – to provide or gather or 
facilitate finances with the intention of using in committing terrorism 
acts or knowing that it will be used entirely or partially, whether the 
act was committed or not in the kingdom or against its citizens or 
interests abroad.’  
 
At a first glance, the above Article seems to be in conformity with the international legal 
order. For instance, under Article 2(1) of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which Jordan has ratified in 2003, the 
terrorist act need not be completed; the funds must have been collected in the knowledge 
or with the intent that they should be used to commit a terrorist act. Also under Article 
2(3), in order for an act to constitute an offence, the funds collected need not actually be 
used to carry out a terrorist act; the fact that they were collected with the intent is 
                                                 
86 Article 157 of the Penal Code of 1960 criminalizes those who establish an association with the purpose of 
committing felonies on people or property, and requires to be punished by imprisonment at hard labor. If the 
criminals’ intent was to commit assault on human life, the punishment is not less than seven years of imprisonment 
at hard labor.   
87 Article 160 of the Penal Code punishes whoever becomes a member in an ‘illegal’ association that commits 
seditious acts, vandalism or uses force and violence to topple the government by imprisonment at hard labor. Article 
162 punishes those who donate, pay membership or provide assistance, or collects donations, membership 
subscriptions or assistance by maximum imprisonment of six months.  
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sufficient. However, given the political landscape when the law was considered and then 
enacted;88 the above provision goes beyond the particular issue of criminalizing the 
financing of terrorism as actus reus, which the Penal Code and the terrorist financing 
laws has dealt with. In practical terms, this article illustrates the collective responsibility 
argument in which sharing the political cause of terrorists mens rea should be punished 
for acts of terrorism because ‘the cause hopes and expects to benefit collectively from 
terrorism,’89 whether the act was committed or not. Therefore, the focus on crime has led 
to what is called the ‘criminalization of politics’, wherein the government could integrate 
between political activism; mainly Islamic, and terrorism through the rubric of charitable 
works. Though there is no concrete or detailed evidence that social welfare in Jordan is 
central to radical Islamists’ ability to recruit, indoctrinate and fund terrorists, yet the 
government is anticipating such a consequence based on the assumption that Islamic 
social welfare organizations answer to the same political leaders who plays a hand-on 
role in political dissent.  
 
Moreover, Article 3(c) asserts the assumption that mere affiliation with a political or 
social welfare group or organization or association, which could be a front organization 
for terror acts, is invoked to classify such person as a terrorist without committing an act 
of terror or a direct proof of intent: ‘forming whatever group or organization or 
association or [being affiliated to] with the intention to commit terrorism acts in the 
kingdom or against its citizens or interests abroad.’ Thus, the legislation provides 
punishment of offenders for this ‘guilt by association’. Article 7(a) punishes for acts 
                                                 
88 The emergence of Hamas as a dominant political party and a ruling one in Cabinet in January 2006. See, Part [III] 
of this dissertation.   
89 See source cited supra note 71 at 174.  
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listed under Article 3 by imprisonment at hard labor (between three and fifteen years) 
provided no harsher penalty is imposed by another criminal law.90  
 
Article 4 provides law enforcement and intelligence with the legal teeth to expand the 
scope of its powers to those who are suspected of their association with terrorism. The 
Prosecutor General of the State Security Court,91 based on ‘reasonable ground’, has the 
authority to put aforementioned suspects under surveillance, restrict their movement, and 
place a temporary hold on suspected terror funds. Several proposals offered while the law 
was under consideration included a range of extraordinary measures found in other 
criminal laws such as detention and renewal of detention, yet were not among the 
provisions ultimately enacted. In fact, the article limits the validity of such decisions to 
one month giving the state the ability to closely monitor suspects, even if their links to 
radical groups are loose; before applying tougher measures available in existing criminal 
laws. Perhaps from the state point of view, rounding up suspects and exaggerating the 
scope of potential threat, arguably have some deterrent value, thus provide added 
security.  
 
What also asserts the precise political nature of this legislation is that it falls short from 
criminalizing acts of terrorism that are committed against foreign targets. For example, if 
a group in Jordan is engaged in fundraising under the guise of operating as a charity, but 
                                                 
90 Article 148(2) of the Penal Code imposes a penalty of hard labor with a minimum five-year sentence for every 
‘terrorist act.’ 
91 Article 7 of the State Security Court Law of 1959 states that State Security Prosecutors and law enforcement 
officers exercise their power in accordance with the Criminal Procedures Law no. 9 of 1961. However, State 
Security Court prosecutor has the power to detain a suspect up to seven-days without charge (in ordinary criminal 
cases the prosecutor must charge detainees within twenty-four hours and the criminal procedures law requires 
“evidence” before the prosecutor can remand a suspect in custody.   
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in reality channels those funds to commit terror acts abroad or against a foreign target, 
notwithstanding any Jordanian target or interest, then affiliation or association with such 
a group is excluded from the scope of the law. In fact this has been in line with Jordan’s 
policy in dealing with Hamas in 1999 when the government refused to permit Hamas 
“military” wing members to reside or operate in the country but allowed other lower-
level Hamas members who are engaged in the “political” and “social” wings to stay in 
Jordan. However, Islamists in Jordan expressed their concern that the law might be 
interpreted to apply to mere association with resistance movements in the region, 
including Hamas and several Iraqi groups. Some Islamic Action Front members in 
parliament proposed inserting a clause to explicitly exclude all forms of resistance against 
occupation and struggle for national independence from acts of terrorism. To date, the 
definition of acts of terrorism is rarely, if ever, enforced by the military court in its 
verdicts or cited by the Court of Cassation in reviewing terrorist’s appeal.92 Thus, it 
remains for possible future use when it may be necessary or expedient to counter the 
threat it was designed for.   
                                                 
92 In September 2006, Jordan's State Security Court sentenced seven people to be executed for their involvement in 
the 11/9 Amman bombings that triggered the issuance of the Prevention of Terrorism Law. However, the case was 
decided based on the articles of Penal Code no. 16 of 1960 and the Firearms and Ammunition Law no. 34 of 1952. 
All seven were found guilty of conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts causing death and destruction (Article 148(4) of 
Penal Code), and illegal possession of weapons and explosives (Article 11(a) of Firearms Law). The key suspect is 
the Iraqi woman Sajida Al-Rishawi, 35, who was arrested a few days after the blasts, which were carried out by 
three Iraqis, including her husband. Rishawi confessed over the state-run Jordan television of being part of the 
suicide gang, but alleged her belt failed to detonate at Radisson SAS, one of the targeted hotels. Rishawi was the 
only defendant in custody; all others were tried in-absentia, including the Jordanian fugitive Al-Zarqawi. Rishawi 
appealed immediately against her sentence. Initially, Rishawi said in a televised confession that her own belt failed 
to detonate and she fled, but she later told her trial that she was an unwilling participant in the attacks and never tried 
to set off her bomb. She also claimed the confessions were extracted through torture but had no evidence of this. In 
January 2007, Jordan's appeals court [“Court of Cassation”] said it “ratified” the military court's death sentence 
because Rishawi was “guilty beyond doubt of possessing explosives and having had the intention and the will to 
carry out terrorist attacks whose outcome is destruction and death.” The appeals court’s decision is final, but 
according to the Constitution (Article 38/9), can be overturned by the King, the ultimate authority in Jordan. See, 




 b. Limiting Religious Space through Legislation 
The second bundle of legislation that Jordan enacted as part of its legal response to the 11/9 
attacks came in the form of legislation that was focused on the use of religion to legitimize 
and mobilize recruits. In 2006, the government enacted two laws that aim to prevent radicals 
from utilizing several mechanisms available within the religio-spatial structure of Islamic 
rituals and community interaction that include, for the most part, mosque-related activities.  
 
i) The Law of Preaching, Guidance and Teaching in Mosques no. 59 of 2006. 
Amending law no. 7 of 1986. 
                                                
Jordan has constantly understood the potential of mosques as an informal social platform to 
disseminate ideology and mobilize collective action.93 Particularly where the press and 
publications are curtailed and constrained, the mosque becomes an important medium of 
expression, at once religious, social, cultural and political, purveying a message wrapped in 
religious symbolism. Thus, it is certainly not new for Jordan to exercise state control over 
religious institutions. Like many states in the Middle East, Jordan has enacted a series of 
measures and strategies to control Islamic religious discourse. The state’s reason for 
regulating public religious fora was to help prevent the dissemination of “unorthodox” 
Islamic views that are critical of the regime, thus inhibit oppositional elements from using 
public religious space to mobilize dissent.   
 
 
93 At one point, the regime through it intelligence services utilized mosques as a recruitment drive of potential 
volunteer fighters in the Afghan fight against the Soviet forces. As one Jordanian observer put it, the regime at one 
point “persuaded young Jordanians to go to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets” through utilizing state-run mosques. 
Interview by International Crisis Group with Samih Khreis, a trial lawyer involved in defending jihadis (March 30, 
2005). See latter source cited supra note 41.  
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In fact, Islamic institutions have been incorporated since the 1960s into the state bureaucracy 
through the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs; namely the Department of Preaching and 
Guidance. This means that all mosques and mosque-related activities, including Friday 
sermons khutba, are controlled by the government. However, the government’s enforcement 
of its religious policy derives from two main practices: Prevent oppositional figures from 
using the mosque as a medium of opposition, and control the content of religious preaching.  
 
In principle, mosques’ Imams are government employees assigned to mosques by the 
ministry, with the intelligence services playing a critical role in their vetting and 
appointment. Thus, the growth of mosques94 has surpassed the government’s capabilities to 
staff them with qualified imams and preachers.95 According to official numbers, around 50 
percent of the country’s 6000-plus awqaf-run mosques are without regime-appointed imams, 
due largely to lack of funding and well-trained imams.96 In addition to the awqaf-run 
mosques, there are privately funded mosques that appoint their own imams, who practically 
can preach uncensored sermons. It has always been a core question for the government how 
to regulate these private mosques.  
 
Clearly, the intelligence keeps an eye on who preaches and what is being preached, 
regardless of whether mosques are state or privately funded. In addition, the Department of 
Preaching and Guidance requests and reviews the names of prospective preachers; mainly 
                                                 
94 According to Jordan’s  Ministry of Religious Affairs; Mosques grew in number from 2710 in 1999 to 6243 in 
2008. Available at: http://www.awqaf.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=90 
95 Although, one of the main functions of the imam is to give the Friday sermon and religious lessons, yet not all 
state-appointed imams are qualified. Thus, the important functions of an imam and preacher remain unfulfilled in a 
substantial number of instances.  
96 As a result of this deficit, outside preachers are frequently brought in mainly to deliver the Friday sermon. 
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before the weekly Friday sermon and has the discretion to deny permission to any preacher 
without specifying reasons.97 According to the law, individuals who violate the written ban 
order are punished by imprisonment for a period of one week to one month or fined a sum of 
US$28 - US$141.98 Nevertheless, the law did not specify a ban period and left it open for the 
minister to decide when and whether to lift the ban on a specific preacher.99 More outspoken 
or influential figures are banned for longer periods of time.  
 
As for the control policy on preached material, it has been characterized by a certain degree 
of informality. Article 3 of the law states that “the preacher should be committed to wisdom 
and proper preaching and shall not attack, accuse, or instigate against individuals or 
institutions and go beyond the guidelines of Islamic teachings.” The informal policy is to 
prevent any actions that might undermine the regime and its legitimacy. There is a set of 
unwritten but well-recognized rules that represent limits to behavior and action tolerated by 
the regime. In general there are three regulative techniques that have been utilized to ensure 
that sermons remain uncritical of the regime. Part of the ministry’s mandate is to suggest 
topics for sermons, and often it requires imams and preachers to speak on certain apolitical 
topics that do not instigate broader opposition throughout the community.100 To keep matters 
in perspective, the ministry rotates preachers between mosques to reduce the opportunity for 
possible controversial oppositional figures from cultivating a loyal constituency. However, 
those who cross the limits of preaching by criticizing state policy are first warned, if they 
                                                 
97 Article 7 of the Law of Preaching, Guidance and Teaching in Mosques no. 7 of 1986, as amended in 2006, gives 
the Minister of Religious Affairs unbounded authority to ban a certain preacher if he violates the provisions of this 
law. 
98 In reality the punishment is often harsher and entails referral to intelligence services for interrogation and possible 
detention. 
99 Article 7(c) of law no. 7 of 1986.  
100 During the 1970s, the ministry sent preachers complete sermons that could be used verbatim.  
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continue, they get banned. And, if they violate the official ban order, they get punished 
according to the law.    
 
This practice of banning preachers became more common since Jordan signed its peace 
treaty with Israel in 1994, which was a move that created widespread grassroots opposition. 
As mentioned earlier, this opposition steered by the country’s own Muslim Brotherhood 
movement, was viewed as potentially destabilizing, thus a threat to Jordan’s national 
security. Under this national security blanket, intelligence intensified its surveillance and 
started to detain political activists; mainly Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front 
members.101 The recent growth of Islamic opposition movements in the region following the 
war on Iraq has prompted the Jordanian state to tighten its control on all mosques. According 
to a Crisis Group report, in September 2004 the government arrested roughly thirty 
mainstream imam, preachers and scholars for turning the mosques into “political meeting 
halls that spreads anti-American sentiments.102  
 
However, mobilization and recruitment at mosques are difficult to regulate because regimes 
cannot prevent people from praying. Following the November 2005 attacks, the government 
introduced a substantial amendment to article 7 of the Law of Preaching, Guidance and 
Teaching in Mosques. By this amendment the government has strengthened its efforts to 
effectively control mosques, and religious space in general, by making the practice of 
                                                 
101 Since the peace treaty, the state attempted to remove critical imams from their government positions. The case of 
Salah Al-Khalidi is the most cited incident in which an imam, for ten years at a central mosque in a heavy populated 
area, was removed from his position for vocally opposing the peace treaty. This incident was recognized by the 
Islamic community as a move to crackdown on imams who oppose state policies. 




prohibiting any individual from preaching or getting involved in any other mosque-related 
activity the general rule. Article 7(a) articulated the state’s new policy of zero tolerance of 
communicating or espousing radical ideologies through religious speech and ritual prior to 
acquiring the written approval of the government i.e. minister of religious affairs. Permission 
is contingent upon government approval of content, and this approval is only granted for 
those who do not link religious practices to an agenda for political change, thus openly 
criticize the state’s policies or oppose the pre-western regime. Through this approach, the 
state seeks to minimize the mobilizing potential of the most important institution within 
religious space that provides an opportunity to disseminate an ideological message and 
muster support for a cause. However, the subsections concerning banning and punishing 
preachers who receive permission to speak but cross tolerable limits remain unchanged.   
 
Again, the question that comes to mind is; how effective is this regulative control of mosques 
as physical structures. Do the limitations imposed on who operates within its context enough 
to diminish the mobilization and recruitment effect of mosques? Arguably, its control has 
substantially and significantly limited how the space can be effectively utilized. Perhaps the 
state’s manipulation of bureaucratic processes, rules and procedures has succeeded in the 
past in usurping the revolutionary or oppositional potential of traditional religious institutions 
by blocking critical Islamic voices from participating in public discourse and mobilizing 
political dissent. However, there are possible reasons to believe in the inefficiency of such an 
approach in blocking radicals from disseminating their ideology through the use of mosques 




Initially, mosques were considered the primary mobilization and recruitment site since it 
provided radicals with an informal network of groups of people who are predisposed to 
religious learning. Thus, formalizing such network by subjecting its operations to legal 
restrictions and administrative practices makes it visible and vulnerable for repression; yet 
diminish its tactical efficacy. Under such circumstances, radicals have two options: surrender 
to state control and its management strategies, which would require radicals to make 
concessions and limit their objectives. Given the ideological imperative that drives radicals’ 
modus operandi, and that of the Islamic movement in general, it seems impossible give up 
their dogmatic trend. This leads to the second option; radicals would look for an institutional 
alternative or reorient themselves toward other nodes to escape regulation and state-
controlled religious space.  
 
Further, the state’s own mobilization of legal constraints and administrative apparatus to 
limit the religious space is largely seen unpopular even among those considered to be 
‘balanced’ thinkers. The use of hidden analogies and continued opposition by some of those 
preachers and imams indicate that the state even after tightening its control does not enjoy 
complete hegemony over the mosque and its religious space. Critical imams refer to the use 
of religious symbols and analogies from Quran to discuss political topics and mobilize 
opposition as a legal “loophole” in which the government cannot contradict or punish for.   
 
Another significant reason that undoubtedly undermines the efficacy of the law is the 
insufficiency of deterrent penalties. A maximum one month imprisonment for those who 
violate the provisions of the law is unlikely to have any substantial deterrent effect upon 
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neither them nor future violators. In fact, many of them might consider going into prison as 
an opportunity to transmit radicals’ ideology through personal, face-to-face interactions 
where they communicate, recruit, and educate.103  
 
ii) The Religious Edict Law no. 60 of 2006. 
                                                
A religious edict or Fatwa is a jurisprudential opinion based on Islamic Law. Though not 
legally binding in a secular legal system,104 fatwas are normally used within religious space 
to lift ambiguity regarding contemporary issues by giving Islamic perspective. Generally, it 
has a significant impact on Muslims’ understandings of the norms and rules that guide 
behavior. Like most states throughout the Middle East, religious institutions that issue fatwas 
are largely controlled by the state.  
 
Before September 11, fatwas has become an instrument of the state to justify some of its 
actions and policies that can be viewed by many Muslim communities as anti-Islamic.105 
Scholars outside such state-sponsored bodies i.e. Muslim Brotherhood do issue fatwas; yet it 
was never a serious cause for concern. However, the utility of fatwas as instruments for 
Islamic opposition started gaining prominence as terrorist groups, particularly Al-Qaeda 
 
103 Radicalization and extremist activities in prisons have been increasingly highlighted as of being of concern. 
However, there has been no legal response to radicals’ activities in prison environment. See source cited supra note 
57 at 1. On December 1, 2008, a local newspaper has reported that law enforcement has launched a new program 
within the context of prisoners’ rehabilitation. The program aims to start a dialogue with those involved in the takfiri 
ideology. Khaluf Tahat, Public Security Directorate launches a Dialogue Program with takfiri culture inmates, 
Alrai Newspaper  (December 1, 2008).  
104 Islamic Law application by Islamic courts is limited to personal status issues such as marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance.  
105 One of the most famous cases in which a government-controlled religious institution issued fatwas in support of 
government actions was in Egypt when its mufti issued a declaration in support of the Camp David Accords. In 
Saudi Arabia, fatwas were used to legitimate controversial government actions such as the use of force against some 
Islamic groups that occupied the Ka’ba in the late 1970s.  
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associated groups in Iraq, utilized in propagating their jihadi ideology against foreign 
occupation and legitimizing their actions by making it seem part of an Islamic obligation.  
 
Before the above legislation was issued, religious edicts were primarily dealt with under 
article 7(c) of the Law of Preaching, Guidance and Teaching in Mosques no. 7 of 1986, 
which stated that formal fatwas are issued by state-sponsored institutions and individuals. 
The law was silent on legality issues relating to independent fatwas issued by non-state 
scholars. A Council of Ifta established in accordance with a government directive was 
charged inter alia with issuing fatwas.106 The council is made up of individuals who are 
financially and structurally dependent on the state.107.  
 
The new legislation reinvigorated the state’s control over the Council’s work by establishing 
an independent body, separate from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which governs the 
Council and reports directly to the prime minister and parliament. Notably, the legislation 
prohibits any individual or entity, beside the Council, from issuing fatwas on public matters 
or undermining the validity of issued fatwas.108 Nevertheless, when the bill was introduced 
into parliament, it contained a penalty of up to one year imprisonment and a fine equivalent 
to US$1400. Thus, the House of Representatives, lead by the Islamic block, vetoed the 
penalty provision and passed the legislation without imposing any punishment.  
 
                                                 
106 The Religious Edicts Directive no.17 of 1997.  
107 Chief of Islamic courts, the general mufti, dean of the school of Sharia at the University of Jordan (public 
university), the mufti of the armed forces, the director of the fatwa department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
and five Islamic scholars appointed by Cabinet for three years. See, article 5 of the Religious Edicts Directive no.17 
of 1997.  
108 Article 12(1) and (2) of the Religious Edicts Law no. 60 of 2006.  
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Hence, the government’s enactment of this legislation came to redefine the utility of fatwas 
from an instrument used to justify state actions to one that denounces religious radicalism 
and terrorism by offering religious refutations of the false interpretations of religious 
extremists.  Although such fatwas may not have a significant impact on current recruits or 
reach the majority of terrorists, their more important role is seen in de-legitimating radicalism 
and terror acts in the eyes of those whom radicals seek to recruit or appeal to for support. 
Yet, politically radicalized and moderate Muslims may not recognize the fatwas that are 
issued by such institution. Although religious leaders and scholars serving on the Council are 
generally well-respected individuals in different areas of Islamic scholarship, yet they are 
part of an institution that falls within the purview of the state. From this it follows that their 
dependence on the state for their salaries and positions, undermines their religious authority 
and present them as mere proponents of the state’s interpretation of Islam.109   
 
c. The Management of Collective Action  
i) Collective Action through civil society organizations 
The state’s regulation of Islamic activism is inextricably linked to broader issues of social 
control in the state, and the authoritarian tendencies are more apparent in the sphere of civil 
society. In Jordan, the scope and content of social interaction is controlled through the use of 
the bureaucratic processes, procedures and regulations. Generally, collective action is only 
permitted through formal organizations. As the International Center for Nonprofit Law noted 
                                                 
109 As FOUAD AJAMI noted in: In the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt, in ISLAM IN THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS, 14, (James Piscatori ed., 1983), such institutions and individuals function to provide 
“religious interpretation in the service of the custodians of power.” 
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in a detailed 2005 report,110 the application process for registering a new organization is 
‘onerous.’ And, after passing through several levels of bureaucracy, the government 
possesses veto power over all applications, and can cancel the registration of already licensed 
organizations. In essence, the government can use its powers to block the formation of any 
organization for political reasons.     
 
A parallel pattern of Islamists activism in Jordan is done through civic organization and 
formal institutionalism. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Islamic movement in Jordan took 
advantage of its special relationship with the regime during martial law era to institutionalize 
its presence through a variety of formal organizations. Most of these activities have operated 
through the Islamic Center Charity Society, which serves as the charitable arm of the Islamic 
movement.   
 
Although none of these activities was political in nature, it grew to have a political effect. 
The movement built schools, medical facilities, and a plethora of charitable societies. These 
institutions provided the movement with a point of contact with communities and an 
opportunity to promote a religious message through concrete projects. Furthermore, by 
providing these social services for communities and predominantly Muslim members, the 
movement was able to utilize the country’s largest charity network to mobilize political 
support and reach new constituencies. This is no secret; both the regime and movement 
members are well-aware of this organizational success. In fact, at different points in history 
the regime has requested the movement to promote political stability through utilizing its 
                                                 
110 Kareem Elbayar, NGOs in Selected Arab States, 6, 17, The International Journal for Not-For-Profit-Law, 
(September 2005).   
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high profile, and legitimacy to delegitimize the claims and ideologies of Islamic radical 
groups that would espouse violence.111 At the same time, the movement has benefited from 
its expansion in civil society, especially after political liberalization in 1989, in developing 
the country’s main political party.  
 
Ever since political opposition took an Islamist discourse, the state has relied more 
exclusively upon administrative techniques that have been already in place since the 1950s 
and 1960s to diminish the prospect for opposition to mobilize within social space. 
Nevertheless, the resurgence of hardliners within the movement’s leadership who have had 
apparent affinities to foreign radical Islamic groups, and have recently led an increasingly 
vocal opposition against state’s policies, was considered alarming. Informed by a concern 
with controlling religious discourse, the regime decided to increase its already stringent 
control over civil society organizations to prevent those radicals from using them as potential 
vehicles for mobilization and recruitment. However, the political reality on the ground 
prevents the state from issuing a list of designated foreign terror organizations similar to the 
blacklist published by the United States Department of State or the European Union or 
declaring certain organizations as such based on their identification with other radical groups. 
In view of that, in the post-11/9 period, the state’s plan was to reassert its claim over existing 
system of control that renders collective action predictable by subjecting the financial sources 
of charitable organizations to further scrutiny and legal measures.  
 
                                                 
111 The regime asked Brotherhood leaders to use their influence and strong ties to Palestinian camps to regain control 
during periods of domestic unrest. See, QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, THE MANAGEMENT OF ISLAMIC 
ACTIVISM: SALAFIS, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND STATE POWER IN JORDAN, 97 (State 
University of New York Press 2001). 
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As aforementioned, the legal basis for the disciplinary power of the state is not new. The Law 
of Societies and Social Organizations no. 33 of 1966 was, until recently, the law applicable to 
the establishment and operation of voluntary organizations, both foreign and national, in the 
kingdom.112 The legislation provided the state with broad inspection powers to ensure that 
organizations’ financial resources are not channeled to finance illegal activities that lie 
outside state’s control or are terror-related. In the event an organization wanders beyond 
legislative confines, particularly failure to provide information that impairs the government’s 
surveillance powers, the government has the power to dissolve the organization, or 
reorganize its leadership structure. For instance, in July 2006 the Ministry of Social 
Development installed temporary government management of the Islamic Center Charity 
Society, and a year later led a massive recruitment of new members to oust the Center’s 
Muslim Brotherhood leadership in members’ elections for a new management.113  
 
However, there are no guidelines or limitations on the right of organizations to raise funds, 
especially foreign funding. By law no organization can affiliate with any foreign organization 
without the express permission of the government, the assumption has been that this rule 
could expand to cover funding.114 Thus, violation of this law carried a penalty of up to three 
months imprisonment and US$70 fine.  
 
                                                 
112 Freedom House described the law as being “a highly restrictive statute even in comparison to other stifling 
Middle Eastern NGO laws.” FREEDOM HOUSE, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG 
(July 2008).  
113 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: JORDAN: EVENTS OF 2007, 496, (2008), available at 
http://hrw.org/wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf 
114 See source cited supra note 110 at 6.   
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Driven by its fear from the growing influence of foreign radical Islamists, in addition to 
deteriorating domestic economic conditions, the government took a number of steps to 
tighten its financial control over charitable organizations. The new Societies Law,115 which 
came into force in December 2008, aims to: offset the growing influence of the Islamic 
movement on mainstream society by restricting the scale of their charity operations, and 
cutoff the dependence of some charitable organizations on outside funding.  
 
The legislation works to improve the system of financial disclosure and transparency through 
rendering all financial aspects of a society visible and subject to the surveillance of the state.  
Therefore, the law bans all licensed organizations from receiving foreign aid, except with the 
permission of the government.116 In case an organization violates this prohibition, the 
government may decide to return, take possession of funds, in addition to imposing other 
penalties prescribed by law. Hence, foreign organizations that are authorized under same 
licensing procedures face an added prohibition from soliciting charitable contributions or 
receiving funds from local sources without the express permission of the government.117  
 
By and large, if an organization fails to disclose its financial sources, allocations and 
expenditures118 or committed infractions to the law or its bylaw, the government, at its 
discretion, issues a notice of violation, if the violation persists, it has the power to appoint a 
temporary board of directors to run the organization until a new board of directors is 
                                                 
115 The Societies Law no. 51 of 2008, published in the Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, vol. 
4928, September 16, 2008.  
116 Article 17(b)(1). 
117 Article 9(c).  
118 Article 17(1). 
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elected.119 Moreover, the government has the power to dissolve the organization if it 
commits the violation for a second time and does not correct it within a two-month period. 
Like the previous legislation, it imposes penalties on those who violate its provisions; 
however, in the new legislation offences are expanded and penalties increased. Article 26(b) 
and (c) imposes a fine up to US$7000 on the person who was responsible for failure to 
disclose or report received funds from local sources. A fine up to US$14000 fine or a 
minimum three months in prison, or both penalties are imposed in case the received funds 
were foreign. 
 
Some organizations in Jordan are registered as non-profit corporations, which have given 
them leeway to operate under a less restrictive law on Companies.120 Notably, such non-
profit organizations have had the power to determine in the articles of association their 
sources of funding, including receiving foreign aid. Under the new law, this option is no 
longer available since all such organizations are required to conform to the new legislation 
within one year from the date the law has gone into force,121 or else it would be subject to 
dissolution.122   
 
To date, the legislation has faced immense criticism. The state is under pressure to review the 
law not only from Islamists who described the law as being “martial” and intended for 
undermining the role of Islamic charity in the country, but also by Western charities; mainly 
                                                 
119 Article 19(a) and (b). 
120 Article 7(d) of the Companies Law no. 22 of 1997. 
121 Article 28 of Law no. 51 of 2008. 
122 Article 20(a)(2). 
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Christian groups123  who now require official approval, and their finances124 and transactions 
are subject to government scrutiny. 
 
ii) Alternative forms of collective action 
Another aspect of Jordan’s management of social control addresses other collective action 
alternatives that operate outside the structure of formal organizations. The state attempts to 
repress unregistered groups activism within different socio-demographic niches of society, in 
addition to collective action that falls outside the regulative capacity of formal organizations. 
The state has therefore taken measures to limit the occurrence of such activities and reduce 
the effect of those that are permitted.  
 
The state is mainly concerned with demonstrations or public gatherings of a political nature; 
not including meetings permitted through political parties. To avoid undesirable potential 
outcomes of demonstrations such as charging silent voices with radical opposition to 
government’s policies, or dissipating into unpredictable forms of violent protests following a 
                                                 
123 Some ranking officials believe that this inclusion of western Christian groups is part of the state’s 
counterterrorism policy. In recent years, United States Evangelicals (e.g. Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary 
[“JETS”], Free Evangelical Church registered in Jordan as Societies) have grown popular and powerful in the 
country through a network of social services they provide to impoverished communities, including Muslim circles. 
The organizational success of such societies has raised concerns: a) the state fears that the high profile of such 
groups might turn them in future targets for al-Qaeda-inspired terror groups. b) The number of people affiliated with 
the Free Evangelical Church is about 8,000 (12,000 estimated number of evangelicals, out of 150,000 estimated total 
of Christians in Jordan). There are about 1,800 people who attend at least one service a week of the Evangelical Free 
Church. The Evangelical Free church has ten branches, and is licensed to purchase land and construct church 
buildings. The Council of Church leaders in Jordan, which is an unofficial body that represents the different 
Christian denominations in Jordan, has expressed their dismay vis-à-vis their constituencies converting to 
Evangelicalism. The government is concerned that if it continue to support the operations of such churches in the 
kingdom that would eventually lead to domestic instability. Both local churches and the Islamic movement seem to 
share a common “enemy,” and would work together to achieve a political aim i.e. expel foreign elements through 
resolving to violence or facilitating it. U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2008), available at: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108485.htm.  
124 Some of these western charities depend on foreign aid as their only source of income. The move could virtually 
lead to the closure of several of such organizations. 
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Friday sermon or an approved meeting, the state requires that such forms of social interaction 
be performed through spaces that are within the reach of state’s administrative practices. This 
state policy is based on the Law of Public Meetings of 1953, which is a regulative holdover 
from martial era. The law stipulated that individuals must obtain permission to hold a public 
meeting defined as “any meeting called to discuss political matters.”125 In 2004, part of the 
government’s promised political reforms to shore up its popularity in the face of domestic 
discontent and defuse international criticism; the government issued a new law126 that 
introduced a different language while keeping the legal mechanisms and authoritarian 
practices intact.127  
 
However, the 2005 terrorist bombings in Amman and Islamists electoral success in 
Palestinian and Egyptian legislative elections in 2005 and 2006 have contributed to the 
growing anxiety of the state vis-à-vis radicalization within Islamists ranks who would utilize 
such impromptu demonstrations to disseminate a radical religious ideology. Not only do such 
events jeopardize the state’s stability and control, but also their visibility often creates 
momentum and energizes a radical base of supporters. Despite the rhetoric of democracy, the 
state reasserted its social control and repression through introducing in 2008 an amendment 
to the law of Public Meetings128 in which it redefines “public meetings” in a manner that 
limits dissent, opposition and any informal form of activism against state public policies.  
 
                                                 
125 Article 2 of Law no. 60 of 1953.  
126 The Law of Public Meetings no. 7 of 2004.  
127 Article 2 of law no. 7 of 2004 defined a public meeting by “A meeting held to discuss a general matter.” 
128 Law no. 40 of 2008, amending the Law of Public meetings no. 7 of 2004.  
61 
 
Wrapped in the sanctity of furthering public freedoms,129 the new legislation kept the basic 
limitation on demonstrations; organizers must obtain the permission from the district 
governor after submitting an application that includes detailed information about the time, 
place, and purpose of the demonstration, in addition to the names, addresses and signatures 
of the organizers.130 It also provided for the same penalties to be imposed on those who 
violate its provisions. However, the legislation contained two substantial amendments to the 
original text. First, amended article 7 is riddled with vague language that is subject to broader 
interpretation and implementation. The article grants the district governor discretionary 
power to end a demonstration if it evolves into what might endanger the lives or public or 
private property or threatens public order. In the original text, such discretional authority 
was restricted to the conditions of the given permit. As for the second amendment, article 9 
extends the authority given to law enforcement officers to end a demonstration or bring back 
order and security, to include intelligence services. It is worth to note that intelligence forces 
have had a continued, ongoing heavy presence, and have infiltrated and closely monitored 
public gatherings in the past, yet it was a de facto power that was never articulated in 
legislation. This new language is certainly associated with Jordan’s counter-ideological 
response to terror threat; sending a deterrent rather than an operational message to radical 
Islamists’ sympathizers.  
 
The propensity to control alternative forms of collective action could include any form of 
mobilization that is not necessarily radical in nature, thus be used toward the suppression of 
                                                 
129 Article 3(a) excluded a number of formal meetings from the scope of application of the law. Hence, the excluded 
meetings are all well-regulated under special laws e.g. Societies Law no. 51 of 2008, Political Parties Law no. 19 of 
2007. 
130 Article 4 of law no. 7 of 2004, as amended 2008.  
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political opposition. For instance, in spite of low internet penetration rate,131 the Islamic 
movement in Jordan is using websites and individualized online platforms such as blogs, as 
an alternative form of activism to adapt to the increasingly restrictive legal measures that are 
being justified under the pretext of terrorism.132 Thus far, the state has not taken any specific 
measure to raise the level of visibility of activists in the Jordanian blogosphere, but 
interpreted that existing restrictive measures apply to online activism.133 Given that the 
global source of threat comes from a relatively small group of radical Islamists, who rely 
heavily on information technology to reach millions of people, disseminate ideological 
themes, and recruit new supports;134 under these developments the state may desire to 
maintain its hegemony over online media activism. Thus, to maintain constant surveillance, 
the state may develop administrative apparatus and regulation against a counter-public sphere 
of discourse that has the potential to penetrate and radicalize mainstream.135 
 
C. Conclusion  
In the aftermath of 9/11, criminal law reform in Jordan was part of the worldwide expansion of 
criminal laws facilitated by UNSC Resolution 1373 that was enacted under mandatory Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. The introduced criminal law amendments were largely offered as a 
symbolic response to 9/11, it was built on the assumption of inadequacy of criminal law without 
                                                 
131 14.8 percent in 2007 and 18.2 percent in 2008. See, INTERNET WORD STATS, JORDAN: INTERNET 
USAGE AND MARKETING REPORT (2008), available at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/jo.htm 
132 Pete Ajemian, The Islamist opposition online in Egypt and Jordan, Arab, Media and Society, (2008). 
133 In January 2006, the government issued national security charges against one of the IAF's leaders, Jamil Abu 
Bakr, for “harming the dignity of the state.” Abu Bakr, the editor of the party’s website, posted an article in 
December 2004 on the website of the Islamic Action Front. The articles, which criticized favoritism in the 
appointment of senior government officials, were written by two IAF parliamentarians. See, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, JORDAN: EDITOR PROSECUTED FOR POSTING ARTICLES BY MPS, 1,2 (2006).  
134 WILLIAM ROSENAU, WAGING THE “WAR OF IDEAS,” 1136 (Rand National Security Research Division 
2006). 
135 J. Downey and N. Fenton, New media, Counter Publicity and the Public Sphere, 5 New Media & Society, 185-




fully understanding the dimensions of deterrence.  Probably with the exception of the new laws 
against the financing of terrorism, the state had a whole range of extraordinary measures 
available if not morally, then practically to counter terrorism.  
 
Jordan also took advantage of the political circumstances to extend the scope of its measures of 
legal control while cooperating with the United States and its western allies in the “war on 
terror.” It was clear not too long before the events of September 11, 2001 that the government 
did not intend to move toward further political and social reforms. The regime’s vision of a new 
Jordan defined by its modern, pro-Western political, economic and cultural agenda was at odds 
with the exigencies of national security and stability, domestically and regionally. Opposition 
from all political trends, including Islamists, made it clear that public opinion has arrived at an 
unprecedented state of agreement on opposing state’s policies that are fundamentally political in 
nature, along with economic and social aspects that cannot be ignored. However, in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Islamic movement per se was dealt with in no separate 
trajectory than that of mainstream political opposition. It was in 2004 that the state’s anxiety vis-
à-vis radicalization within its own Islamic movement’s ranks started to reflect on its terrorism 
policy.   
 
In 2005, following the terrorist bombings in Amman, the state announced its new counter-
ideological approach that is primarily focused on the Islamist movement opposition, its foreign 
allegiance, and essentially, its role in mobilizing a radical political opposition. The counter-
ideological approach had three arms: a) special terrorism legislation that establishes the concept 
of collective responsibility and punishment as a deterring element to prevent new recruits; b) 
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controlling the minutiae of religious activity in the kingdom through regulating Islamic space 
and rituals. The regime attempts to produce a depoliticized and non-radical interpretation of 
Islam, at the same time mobilize religious institutions to promote its interests; c) management of 
collective action through controlling social platforms and possible alternative forms that expose 
mainstream Islamists to those who may offer them alternative ideologies and alternative courses 
of action, even terrorism. Evidently, the legal provisions of this counter-ideological approach 
provided a legal and regulative rather than punitive framework, heretofore, had minimal 
deterrent value in terms of imposed penalties.   
 
Such an approach inevitably raises questions of civil liberties, since it could be directed at those 
who may share with radical Islamists political goals, though not their means, but because they do 
not operate secretly are easier targets for the state. Although, the state has been relatively 
restrained in its use of these restrictive powers, the provision’s can be implemented at any 
moment given the extreme circumstances in the region. Jordanian officials often argue that any 
restrictive measures are actually quite moderate, when compared to most other states in the 
region. Hence, some conservative voices from the liberal West seem to justify the use of such 
measures by authoritarian but useful regimes, saying that these measures are certainly no harsher 
than many of other widely used coercive tools in the global campaign against radical Islamists 
terrorism.  
 
Demonstrating the Jordanian counter-ideological approach was an attempt to find out whether 
such legal measures would lead to greater radicalization, perhaps terrorism against its own 





disaffection. In theory, to answer this question we must differentiate between two possible 
audiences; radical Islamists who utilize instrumental political causes within social and religious 
space to mobilize new recruits, and Islamic opposition who represent legitimate dissent. In terms 
of radical Islamists, such group depends primarily on informal networks that operate outside 
state controlled organizational space to connect like-minded Islamists to one another as they 
promote their radical message of religious change. The reliance on face-to-face interactions 
through informal networks is most likely the reason why such groups tend to mobilize through 
religious and social activities within civil society. To a certain extent, the state’s restrictive body 
of legislation tends to constrain their reach, reduce the message and mobilizing effect on main 
stream Islamists; however, radicals will always seek alternative informal structures to transmit its 
message of change.     
  
As for legitimate political dissent, which happens to take an Islamic discourse, the state’s 
restrictive measures may ultimately serve to alienate the moderates who currently make up the 
overwhelming majority of its activists and drive them toward radicalism, thus empowering the 
radical Islamists. However, this renders relative moderation more of a political challenge than 
radical Islamist forms of political mobilization itself.  
 
 
*** 
 
